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1. ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
The Animal welfare science is mostly focused on 
evaluating and improving the quality of life of animals that 
actually exist. This leaves out a range of ethically relevant 
issues regarding the quantity of life – in terms of number 
of animals living and the longevity of each animal. In 
many cases quantity and quality are related, and often 
there is a tension between the two. In this chapter, we 
develop a discussion around four practical cases 
presenting quality-quantity dilemmas: a) the issue of dairy 
cow longevity, b) the early slaughter of male dairy calves, 
c) the killing of newly-hatched male layer chicks and d) 
the conflict between reduction and refinement in animal 
research. The practical, economic and animal welfare 
aspects characterizing each case are presented together 
with relevant stakeholders’ perspective. We discuss the 
cases in light of the most relevant currents of thought in 
animal ethics, highlighting the main values at stake and 
which possible solutions may be sought according to 
each perspective. 
 
2. INTRODUCTION 
 
Most of the attention in animal welfare science, be it in 
practical research or in theoretical discussion, is given to 
how animals live their lives, that is the quality of life. But 
dilemmas around the killing of animals also involve 
considerations of the value of life. This kind of discussion 
is perhaps most visible in companion animal medicine, 
where euthanasia may relieve a severely ill animal from 
further suffering but at the same time breaks a strong 
human-animal bond and leaves a grieving owner alone. It 
is the companion animal angle that Sandøe and 
Christiansen (2007) take as a starting point for their 
analysis of the ethical issues at stake. However, related 
dilemmas arise in all fields of animal use. In this paper we 
rely on cases from farming and animal experimentation to 
widen the discussion.  
 
In particular when moving outside of the companion 
animal field, the concept of quantity takes on two possible 
meanings: Quantity as lifespan (longevity) of individual 
animals and Quantity as the number of animals (at a 
given moment in time or accumulated numbers over 
time). Both of these aspects are relevant for a discussion 
on the value of animal life in farm and laboratory animals. 
In this chapter, we consider them both in discussing the 
following four dilemma cases:   
 
 Dairy cow longevity where concern is arising over 
the decreasing lifespan of dairy cows, which seems 
to present a choice between more cows living less 
time (and possibly with worse welfare) or fewer 
cows living more time (and supposedly a better life) 
 Male dairy calves which may be slaughtered at less 
than a week of age (thus having extremely short 
lives) or fattened for a few months under 
questionable conditions to produce veal (longer 
lives but of debatable quality) 
 Male layer chicks that are typically killed at hatching 
and where the most plausible alternative to be 
developed seems to be a further shortening of this 
extremely short existence.  
 Laboratory animals where the re-use of animals in 
multiple experiments and the principle of reduction 
of animal numbers give rise to dilemmas between 
quality of life and quantity of animals.  
  
 
 
These dilemmas involve issues having to do with the 
quality and duration of the lives of animals that will be 
born and live, and the discussion will focus on these 
issues. However, some issues of whether or not certain 
animals would be brought into existence will also be 
addressed. 
 
There are some more fundamental philosophical issues 
that are relevant for life and death decisions affecting 
animals but which go beyond the scope of this paper. 
These include the challenge of deciding whether the life 
of another individual of a different species is worth living, 
and questions having to do with whether animals have a 
will to live or a notion of the future and how having or 
lacking these concepts interacts with the harm caused by 
death. Others (e.g. Bruijnis et al., 2012; Yeates, 2011) 
have addressed these questions in detail and we refer the 
interested reader to these texts.  
 
To shed light on the four situations we consider the 
practical issues involved – such as the existence and 
feasibility of alternatives – in combination with the ethical 
issues at stake. We develop the discussion against the 
background of the major theoretical considerations 
around balancing quality and quantity, which implies 
considering the value of animal life, and also in the light of 
relevant surveys and focus group discussions.  
 
 
3. FOUR PRACTICAL CASES 
 
3.1 Longevity of dairy cows 
There is widespread concern over a decrease in longevity 
of dairy cattle (although reversing trends have been 
reported (Farm Animal Welfare Council, 2009)). Before 
the intensification of farming practices during the second 
half of the 20th century there were records of Jersey 
cattle living more than 25 years (Odlum, 1950) but today 
it is common for Holstein cows to be culled at four years 
of age. The reasons for this dramatic decrease in life 
expectancy are multiple. It has been argued that they 
derive from the genetic selection of dairy cows for 
increased milk yield: high-producing dairy cows suffer 
from production diseases such as lameness, mastitis, 
ketosis and reduced fertility (Oltenacu and Broom, 2010) 
(and may also have other welfare problems: Figure 1). 
These diseases have great impact on the health and the 
welfare of animals and on their productivity. It is often the 
low economic viability that supports the decision of (early) 
culling. In a recent analysis of cattle mortality in France 
between 2003 and 2009 (and relying on a database of 75 
million animals), Perrin and colleagues (2011) identified a 
peak of mortality in both beef and dairy cows at around 
three years of age. In beef cattle, killing the animal is a 
requirement for getting the product. In contrast, milk is 
produced by living animals, and the mortality peak at 
three years requires a different explanation; however, the 
cited study does not distinguish between different 
reasons for mortality. There is also a complex interaction 
between genetic progress, the availability of replacement 
heifers and decision-making over culling. A farmer may 
keep most or even all healthy heifers to ensure sufficient 
replacement, and for each heifer ready to calve the least 
productive cow in the herd will be culled. Considering 
genetic progress, the heifer can be assumed to be 
‘genetically superior’ to the cow she replaces, so at the 
time point culling and replacement will be a sensible 
decision, even though in a larger perspective the decline 
in longevity driven by such decisions may be 
questionable (Erling Strandberg, personal 
communication).  
 
Figure 1. Holstein-Friesian dairy cow conformation has 
changed over years of selective breeding, resulting in taller, 
longer and thinner cows. Note that the lying cow in this 
photo from a UK dairy farm is longer than the bedded stall.  
Photo: Manuel Magalhães-Sant’Ana. 
 
  
 
The high-yield systems have a somewhat contradictory 
effect on the number of existing lactating cows: fewer 
animals are needed to produce the same amount of milk, 
but there is an increased need of replacement heifers to 
renew the short-lived animals. In Europe, the total volume 
of milk production has been constant for several decades, 
despite a gradual decline in the number of dairy cows that 
exist at any given time  (Hocquette and Chatellier, 2011), 
a trend that can also be found in other developed 
countries (FAOSTAT, 2012). This has other 
consequences outside the dairy industry because, after 
slaughter, dairy cows provide meat and leather. The dairy 
sector represents 57% of global cattle meat production 
(FAO, 2010), although this figure includes bull calves of 
dairy breeds raised specifically for meat production. 
 
Although duration of life is rarely considered an animal 
welfare issue, longevity can be used as an indicator of 
welfare. Bruijnis and co-workers use the case of dairy 
cow lameness as a proxy to consider longevity as a 
constitutive element of animal welfare. They argue that an 
animal should be allowed to live long enough to have the 
opportunity to perform species-specific behaviours and to 
flourish, an important part of “natural living”, a concept 
they include in animal welfare (Bruijnis et al., 2012). 
Natural living is a concept particularly pertinent within the 
context of organic farming, but Vonne Lund does not 
seem to include longevity as an element of natural living 
in her seminal paper (Lund, 2006). As we shall discuss 
later in this chapter, from an ethical perspective it makes 
a difference whether increased longevity means a longer 
life with the same health and welfare issues that (now, at 
least) partly motivate early culling, or a long life as a 
consequence of an improved health status. 
 
The dairy cow longevity question and the male dairy calf 
question, discussed below, are related. Increasing cow 
longevity reduces the need for replacement heifers. This 
may make it economically viable for farmers to 
inseminate cows with the most desirable phenotype with 
sexed dairy breed semen to obtain replacement heifers 
and use semen from beef breeds for the remaining cows.  
With this approach, only those calves purposely bred to 
become replacement heifers would be of a full dairy type, 
whereas those that would go into meat production would 
be crossbred. However, the price for sexed semen is 
roughly double that of normal semen, and many cows 
require multiple inseminations (reduced fertility being a 
production-related disorder). Therefore, as long as most 
female calves born are considered to be needed as 
replacement heifers, sexed semen is unlikely to be the 
preferred option and the problem of male calves of a dairy 
genotype is likely to persist.   
 
3.2 The male dairy calf  
With the increasing specialization of cattle breeds into 
dairy and meat production, the value of rearing dairy 
calves for meat production has decreased. This 
phenomenon has long been known in breeds with a 
traditional pronounced dairy phenotype such as Jersey, 
but is now increasingly also affecting the originally more 
dual-purpose Holstein-Friesian cattle. The practical 
consequences of this have not been taken to such 
extremes as in poultry production (see below), as male 
Holstein-Friesian calves are still being raised and 
slaughtered, but at least in some countries a considerable 
proportion of calves are killed during the first week of age, 
as raising them for later slaughter is not considered 
economical.   
 
Contrary to many of the ethical issues in animal 
production, the birth of unwanted bull calves of dairy 
breeds is not a problem exclusive to large-scale modern 
intensive animal production. To produce milk, a dairy cow 
must give birth to a calf about once every year. Despite 
the changes in milk yield, growth rate and food turnover, 
‘one lactation = one calf’ has remained unchanged since 
the beginning of dairy farming. To generate the same 
amount of milk from cows with a lower milk yield, more 
calves would have to be born. In her book Animal 
Machines (1964, p62), Ruth Harrison pointed out the 
problematic consequences of this dependency and gave 
figures for her era (in which the average UK dairy cow 
produced approximately half the amount of milk produced 
by an early 21st century cow (Oltenacu and Broom, 
2010)): 
 
An unavoidable characteristic of the rearing of animals is 
that approximately the same number of male and female 
off-spring will be produced. It follows that where cows are 
kept for milk there is the problem of what to do with male 
calves, many of which are not suitable for rearing as beef 
  
 
because the strain has been developed primarily for its 
milking potential. It has been estimated that the surplus of 
unwanted calves, ‘bobby calves’, in this country amounts 
to some 800,000 to 1,000,000 yearly.  
 
Not very different from 50 years ago, these calves go into 
one of three possible routes. They may be slaughtered as 
bob(by) calves, at only a few days of age, or they may be 
fattened for slaughter for production of veal (up to 8 
months of age, according to European marketing 
regulations) or beef / young beef / rosé veal. To produce 
the characteristic, light coloured meat, veal calves are 
raised mainly on milk products, whereas calves 
slaughtered at an older age are fed a cereal-based diet 
(AVMA, 2008; Sans and de Fontguyon, 2009)  
 
Of the estimated 30 million dairy calves born in 2008 in 
EU-27, just under 6 million (i.e. over 40% of male dairy 
calves) went into veal calf production. In Europe, this 
production is greatly dominated by two countries, The 
Netherlands and France. In other European countries, 
male dairy calves that are not slaughtered shortly after 
birth are either fattened until 8-12 months of age or 
exported to one of the veal production countries (Sans 
and de Fontguyon, 2009). In the USA, in terms of animal 
numbers veal production is fairly equally split between 
calves slaughtered a few days after birth and calves 
formula-fed until 16-20 weeks of age, with a slight 
majority of bobby calves (e.g. USDA, 2011).  
 
Veal calf production is controversial because it is 
associated with a range of animal welfare issues, starting 
with the transport and comingling of week-old calves from 
different dairy farms, and followed by the specific rearing 
conditions and diet designed to produce the typical white 
veal meat. Whereas the most extreme housing conditions 
in which calves were crated or tethered in permanent 
darkness are now outlawed in Europe (European Union, 
1997), single-housing and tethering throughout the 
fattening period is still widespread in the USA (AVMA, 
2008). Across the world, veal calf production implies 
prolonging the period that calves are fed mainly liquid 
food (milk replacement) beyond what would be 
physiologically normal, and maintaining the animals with 
a low iron status. Even though present European 
legislation requires minimum provision of fibrous food, a 
recent epidemiological study showed that poor rumen 
development and abomasal lesions are still frequent in 
calves from European white veal production (Brscic et al., 
2011) 
  
Whereas the issue at stake in veal calf production is 
primarily feeding and housing conditions, slaughtering 
calves shortly after birth is controversial on the grounds of 
the extremely short life these animals are given. In 
combination, these issues motivated the RSPCA and 
Compassion in World Farming to convene a stakeholder 
forum to discuss actions to change the future of UK dairy 
calves. The early 21st century UK situation very clearly 
illustrates several aspects of the dilemma. As described 
by Ruth Harrison, there is a tradition of exporting bobby 
calves for veal production in continental Europe. During 
the years when this market was unavailable as a result of 
the BSE-motivated export ban on UK cattle, on-farm 
killing of male new-born calves increased, to the point 
that it had practically doubled by 2006, the year in which 
the ban was lifted. Nevertheless, even then an estimated 
138,700 of the 438,000 male dairy calves born in the UK 
were killed on the farm (Beyond Calf Exports Stakeholder 
Forum, 2008). Such early on-farm killing of calves is 
usually combined with destruction of the carcass, thus the 
meat is not used for human consumption. Contrary to 
practice in Europe, the main route (91%) for Australian 
non-replacement dairy calves is commercial slaughter at 
5-7 days: an estimated 700,000 calves a year are 
slaughtered this way (Animal Health Australia, 2011). 
 
3.3 The male layer chick 
Today’s poultry production is highly specialized, to the 
extent that all commercial production is dominated by 
lines genetically selected for meat or egg-laying 
presented by a few multinational companies. The sex of 
the birds is an issue for production considerations in both 
meat and egg production, but while a female broiler 
chicken is still useful albeit slightly less productive than 
her male counterpart, male layer chicks are of no 
commercial value; they do not lay eggs and their slender 
bodies and slow growth make them unable to compete 
with broilers for meat production (even though this has 
  
 
been tried
1
). Day-old male chicks of layer lines are 
presently killed, either by exposure to CO2 gas (after 
which carcasses can be used as animal feed) or by 
maceration (instant death but more limited use of the 
carcasses; see Leenstra et al., 2011 for a discussion of 
these alternatives). 
 
Leenstra and collaborators (2011) investigated the view 
of Dutch citizens on how to manage male layer chicks in 
poultry production, using a combination of focus group 
interviews and an internet-based survey. Participants 
were asked to choose between and comment on ten 
alternative approaches divided into three main groups 
(Table 1).  
 
The participants were unaware of the practice of killing 
day-old male chicks and were initially shocked to learn 
about it. When discussing the issue and the list of 
alternatives in focus groups, people considered a number 
of aspects, including animal-friendliness, naturalness, 
risks for human and animal safety but also practical 
considerations such as feasibility as well as resource and 
financial economics. No clear preferred option was 
evident, but “the study indicated that most people would 
support the pursuit of technological alternatives”, with the 
preferred technological alternatives being “i) looking into 
the fresh egg (to determine the sex of the egg and not 
incubate male eggs); ii) influencing the laying hens such 
that they produce fewer male eggs; and iii) using genetic 
modification to facilitate sexing fresh eggs”. Participants 
were also favourable to the idea of a dual-purpose type 
chicken, even though they recognized that this was not a 
very realistic option. 
 
Of the alternatives presented by Leenstra and co-
workers, only one is actually being considered for 
practical use: examining samples of incubating embryos 
in order to destroy male embryos. It is not yet in 
commercial use, but there seem to be only relatively 
                                                        
1 Leenstra et al. (2011, pp37-8) report that “Experiments 
have been performed in a number of countries to rear layer-
type males to a live weight of approximately 600 g and 
market them as an alternative for quail, or to a live weight 
of approximately 2,000 g and market them as an alternative 
to broiler chickens … [but they] require virtually twice the 
amount of feed and three times as much time to reach the 
required bodyweight, compared to broilers.” 
minor practical obstacles left before it would be feasible to 
implement this practice (Michael Clinton, personal 
communication, May 2012). 
 
3.4 Reducing, re-using and refining in animal 
experimentation  
The use of animals for scientific purposes raises specific 
issues in regards to the value of life vs. quality of life. The 
restrictive conditions under which laboratory animals are 
housed are not worse (and sometimes better) than those 
in which production animals live, but the fact that animals 
in biomedical research are often intended to model 
disease presents particular challenges when it comes to 
providing “freedom from pain, injury or disease”. 
Therefore, it is sometimes not possible to provide 
laboratory animals with ‘a life worth living’ (see Yeates, 
2011, for an overview of the origin of the concept). In 
such situations, early killing may be the most effective 
way to relieve welfare problems.  
 
Technological solutions 
 
Looking into the egg 
1. Determining the sex of freshly laid eggs and not 
incubating male eggs 
2. Determining the sex of early embryos and destroying 
the male embryos 
3. Determining the sex of late embryos and destroying 
the male embryos 
 
Changing the hen 
4. Environmentally influencing the hens to produce 
fewer male eggs 
5. Crossing the parents in such a way that male embryos 
are not viable 
 
Genetic modification 
6. To facilitate sexing of freshly laid eggs and not 
incubating male eggs 
7. To make sex reversal of male embryos into female 
chickens possible 
8. Such that male embryos die during early development 
 
Other solutions 
9. Accepting the current practice of killing day-old 
chickens 
10. Less specialized chickens, so that the males can be 
used for meat production (dual purpose chicken)  
 
Table 1. Potential ways to manage the problem of male 
chicks of layer breeds, which have no commercial or 
production value and are currently killed as day-old. 
After Leenstra et al. (2011)  
 
  
 
Fortunately, in most cases there are effective measures 
to reduce such distress and improve the wellbeing of 
animals used in research ("Refinement", one of the 3 Rs 
proposed by Russell and Burch, 1959) without 
compromising research results (Figure 2).  
 
Some such refinements imply sharing the burden by 
several animals so that each animal is exposed to less 
accumulated distress. This is sometimes described as the 
“fairness to the individual” approach (Tannenbaum, 
1999), but it conflicts with another of the 3Rs, “Reduction” 
(of animal numbers), as improving the wellbeing of each 
individual animal is done at the cost of using more 
animals (Olsson et al., 2012; de Boo et al., 2005). The 
practical situation in which this dilemma is most evident is 
in the choice between re-using animals from a previous 
experiment or using new animals. Another case where 
refinement and reduction collide is the choice between 
group housing and single housing of animals in 
experiments requiring data at the cage level, such as in 
dietary research (Festing and Altman, 2002). Group 
housing of social animals is a refinement, but in this case 
the cage becomes the experimental unit and group 
housing will hence result in more animals used.  
 
We presented such reduction-refinement dilemmas to 
195 participants in eight laboratory animal science 
courses held in four different institutions; most (83% 
overall) would rather house mice in pairs than individually 
(Franco and Olsson 2014). Biology undergraduate 
students (n=71) with no experience in using animals in 
research responded in a similar way, with 85% favouring 
refinement and 15% favouring reduction (own 
unpublished data).  
 
A more drastic reduction/refinement dilemma was 
presented to participants in 11 laboratory animal science 
training courses (n=235), who were asked to choose 
between two hypothetically equally valid approaches for a 
given experiment: (i) conducting twenty considerably 
painful procedures – but with no permanent damage – on 
the same mouse across 20 days, or (ii) conducting one 
single procedure per mouse on 20 mice. In both options, 
animals would be euthanized at the end of the 
experiments. This could be a realistic albeit drastic 
representation of the re-use situation. Answers to this 
dilemma were more evenly distributed (49% for using 
twenty mice; 51% for twenty trials with the same mouse). 
When asked what their approach would be for other 
species, regardless of their previous answer, almost 
every respondent chose the same approach for rabbits 
(99% of those who had chosen 20 trials on one mouse 
and 91% of those who had chosen to use 20 animals). 
However, when it came to dogs and primates, many of 
Figure 3. Distribution of answers to 
the question:  “Animals used in 
experiments are sometimes 
transferred to “sanctuaries”, or even 
given for adoption – instead of being 
euthanized – when their research 
purpose ends and rehabilitation is 
possible. However, that is not the 
case for most species.  
 
In your opinion, for which animal 
species should this kind of measure 
be considered, whenever possible?”  
 
(From Franco and Olsson, 2014) 
Figure 2. Repeated use of animals is not always in conflict 
with animal welfare. Dogs used in pharmacokinetic 
studies in which low doses of drugs are administered are 
an example of how research animals can be given long and 
healthy lives within the research setting.  
Photo: Understanding Animal Research. 
 
  
 
those who had previously opted for using 20 mice 
changed their approach, namely 31% for dogs, 21% for 
rhesus macaques and 38% for chimpanzees (32, 56 and 
48% for biology undergraduate students). For these 
respondents, the way one values the life of a given 
animal versus the quality of life for each animal, appears 
to depend on which species the animal belongs to. Using 
large numbers of animals to avoid cumulative suffering is 
seen as a more acceptable approach for mice and rabbits 
than for primates and dogs. This was further 
substantiated by answers to a question about whether 
animals should be adopted or moved to sanctuaries after 
the experiment; rehabilitation was considered most 
important for companion animal species and non-human 
primates (Figure 3).  
 
4. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRACTICAL 
CASES 
 
After having introduced the central issues regarding the 
four case-studies, we move to an appraisal of each one in 
light of the animal ethics theories of more relevance for 
these cases. These include utilitarianism, animal rights 
theory, virtue ethics, relational perspective, 
contractarianism, Judeo-Christian morals and 
environmental ethics.  
 
Utilitarian theory relies on the aggregate consequences of 
actions, i.e. the right action is the one that produces the 
best overall good. While hedonistic utilitarians like 
Bentham and Mill held that we should act to maximize net 
happiness (Singer, 2011), Peter Singer (2011, p13) has 
proposed that our actions should aim to do what on 
balance “furthers the interests of those affected.” In the 
utilitarian take on animal ethics, the capacity to 
experience suffering and pleasure is usually taken as the 
basis of interest (Singer, 1975). While quality of life 
certainly is central to utilitarian theory, that this line of 
thinking does not consider each individual life as valuable 
in itself has consequences for its view on killing as well as 
for bringing individuals into existence. Therefore, the 
short life-span of dairy cows can be seen as posing little 
ethical concern in itself as long as the life of one cow is 
replaced by the life of another milk producing cow. In this 
way the life of a sentient being is replaced by the life of an 
equivalent one and the end result is no more or no less 
pleasure or suffering than if the same cow had been 
maintained for a longer life. Or in fact, there may even be 
a net gain, if the cow to be culled has health problems 
which imply pain and suffering such as lameness or 
mastitis (typical production-related diseases in dairy 
cows), whereas the heifer to replace her is healthy. 
However, this is not to say that a dairy production system 
in which cows only last one or two lactations is always 
unproblematic in utilitarian terms. If the health and welfare 
problems develop as the result of how cows are bred, fed 
or managed, this is clearly an issue of utilitarian 
relevance. A similar argument can be made in the case of 
male dairy calves. The consumer demand for white veal 
could (at least theoretically
2
) either be satisfied through 
slaughtering a greater number of dairy calves at a very 
early age (and consequently low weight), as in Australia, 
or by rearing these calves for longer as in Europe.  And 
given the particular welfare problems associated with veal 
production, it may actually from the utilitarian perspective 
be better for a calf to live a very short but relatively 
painless life than to have to undergo first transport, often 
for long distances, and then rearing with an inappropriate 
diet. Interestingly, the proposed solution to avoid killing of 
day-old male layer chicks may actually remove this case 
from the realm of utilitarian moral preoccupation, at least 
if the arguments of Mellor and Diesch (2007) are 
accepted that chicks have very limited or even no 
conscious neural activity before hatching. As for the 
refinement-reduction conflict in laboratory animals, there 
is really no dilemma for the utilitarian; a greater number of 
animals living a less distressful life is clearly preferable to 
a smaller number of animals enduring more individual 
suffering.  
In contrast to the utilitarian outlook, the value of animal 
life is central to animal rights theory. This approach is 
based on an extension of the Kantian concept of intrinsic 
value to all sentient beings, a view that inherently affords 
animals the right to be treated always as an end in 
themselves (Regan, 1989). Built into this right is the right 
to life, and therefore killing an animal is only acceptable 
under some very special circumstances: under extreme 
                                                        
2 To test the practical feasibility would require simulations 
(taking into account the number of animals potentially 
available and considerable differences in slaughter weight 
of bobby calves and veal calves) that go beyond the scope of 
this chapter.   
  
 
situations of self-defence when two rights to life stand 
against each other or when being killed is in the rights-
holder’s own interest. This view presents us with what 
appears to be the most compelling argument for favouring 
long lives. However, the animal-rights view would a priori 
reject both farming and experimentation on the grounds 
that animals are ends in themselves and cannot be used 
as means to an end. That is, from the animal rights 
perspective, maintaining a production animal is 
inadmissible, independently of its longevity. Still, having 
no dairy cows works for future cows but fails to address 
the lives of the existing ones; in order to preserve their 
rights, these animals would have to be housed in 
sanctuaries, with minimum human interference till the 
moment they would die from old age. Interestingly, this is 
what a recent UK initiative to produce Ahimsa milk, or 
slaughter-free milk proposes to do (www.ahimsamilk.org). 
 
A second set of theories focuses primarily on the role of 
the human actor rather than on the animal as subject of 
the act. Virtue ethics proposes that moral conduct is 
based on the practice of fundamental virtues and the 
avoiding of vices, essentially seen from an 
anthropocentric perspective. Through a relational 
perspective on ethics, the moral status of animals is 
affected by the type of relationship humans establish with 
these (types of) animals. According to a relational point of 
view, we have much stronger moral responsibility towards 
animals in our care or to which we can closely relate than 
towards others (Sandøe and Christiansen, 2008; Palmer 
and Sandøe, 2011).  
 
Good animal husbandry is essential in a virtue ethics 
perspective. A virtuous, responsible farmer provides his 
or her cows with the best possible care. The relational 
aspects are particularly important: animal husbandry 
implies a bond between the farmer and the animals. This 
bond is usually greater the longer it endures. In practical 
terms this means that a compassionate farmer would only 
break the bond for the benefit of the cows (e.g. enduring 
suffering) or because of the prospect of economic loss. 
The research animal issue may lead to very different 
conclusions, starting from a virtue ethics point of view, 
depending on one’s overall view of the value of animal 
research. For a person who seriously questions that 
animal research is useful, supporting it would not be 
virtuous, because if no good comes out of the research it 
must be considered unnecessary harm (Hursthouse, 
2006). If one sees animal research as a sound means to 
develop therapies to cure or ease the burden of disease, 
than it becomes a moral imperative to carry on using 
animals, albeit as humanely as possible. The killing of 
animals used in experiments may be seen as a 
compassionate attitude if this is the best measure to 
avoid unacceptable suffering or if the scientific objectives 
are already met and the animals cannot be rehabilitated 
for re-use or re-homing. On the other hand, whenever the 
conditions so permit, allowing animals to go on living a life 
worth living may be seen as the virtuous thing to do.  
 
The relational perspective gives humans moral duties 
primarily (or even exclusively) towards animals in human 
care or to which humans can in any way closely relate 
(like primates) but much less so (or not at all) towards 
others (Palmer and Sandøe, 2011; Sandøe and 
Christiansen, 2008). This explains why only 18% of 
European citizens disapprove of the use of mice in 
biomedical research, but 37% disapprove of the use of 
dogs and primates for the same purpose (Crettaz von 
Roten, 2012). This differentiation seems to have 
consequences also for determining the value of life – at 
least that seems a plausible interpretation of why 
researchers consider non-human primates and 
companion animals much more appropriate for 
rehabilitation (thus avoiding killing) than rodents. As the 
relational perspective also gives value to the human-
animal relationship, it would also support keeping the 
same dairy cow for longer rather than replacing her. It is 
unlikely that such a relationship exists for newly hatched 
chicks or newborn dairy calves. 
 
One influential approach going back to Hobbes is contract 
theory. In this, and in more contemporary versions of 
contractarianism such as defended by Jan Narveson and 
others, animals have no moral standing. The underlying 
idea of contractarian ethics is that moral obligations 
derive from the mutual agreement between different 
parties. As animals can neither claim their rights nor 
demand any duties from humans, the classical 
contractarian perspective on animals is that any animal’s 
life and welfare are relevant only in so far as they matter 
to other humans. However, some animal ethicists have 
  
 
described the human relationship with farm animals in 
terms of a contract (Lund et al., 2004; Rollin, 2008) in 
which the animals are actually partners. Such a tacit 
partnership could also fit into a contemporary Christian 
perspective on animals. The Judeo-Christian tradition 
assigns humans dominion over creation (from Genesis 
1:26-30), but there are different interpretations of how this 
dominion should be exerted (Fellenz, 2007). The despotic 
perspective rests on the assumption that nature, including 
animals, was created by God to serve humans, whereas 
the stewardship perspective emphasizes the human 
responsibility to take care of Creation (Barad-Andrade, 
1991). The official standing of the Catholic Church today 
is much closer to the stewardship view, in stating that 
“animals, by their mere existence … bless [man] and give 
him glory. Thus men owe them kindness” (The Holy See, 
1993. Part Three, Section Two, Chapter Two, Article 
7:2416). Moreover, although the use and killing of 
animals for food, clothing and research is seen as 
legitimate – and therefore not sinful – the Church clearly 
points out that this must be done within limits and in such 
a way as to avoid unnecessary suffering (The Holy See, 
1993). The best option in a quantity-quality dilemma will 
again depend on the situation; these theories give no 
standard recommendations either way.   
 
A concrete example of how a classical contractarian 
attitude may affect the issue of longevity is patent in 
article 26 of the 63/2010/EU directive, which states that 
“animals such as dogs and cats should be allowed to be 
rehomed in families as there is a high level of public 
concern as to the fate of such animals” (European 
Commission, 2010). Thus, to meet the implicitly 
contracted obligations towards citizens and voters, 
governmental agencies grant special protection to 
specific groups of animals, in virtue of their value in the 
eyes of the public. As regards dairy farming, the 
acceptable life span of the animal is a direct result of its 
productivity, from a classic contractarian point of view. If 
increasing the turnover of their livestock is in the interests 
of farmers, then that is the right thing to do. Maintaining 
the profit margins and obligations towards retailers and 
consumers are arguments used by farmers to justify 
farming practices with high turnovers. On the other hand, 
such obligations towards consumer demands can be 
drivers for less intensive animal farming regimes, as a 
result of increasing public concern for animal welfare, of 
which the biological (organic) dairy and meat are an 
example. Contract theories that include animals as 
partners would rather favour allowing these animals to 
live longer, at least if their health and welfare would 
permit it, in a similar way as in virtue ethics (see above). 
 
From a modern Judeo-Christian perspective, cruel 
treatment of animals is of more ethical concern than the 
sacrificing of animal lives. Humans are entitled to use 
animals, but inflicting unjustified, avoidable suffering is 
morally condemnable. Some factory farming practices – 
such as the artificial fattening of geese for foie gras 
production and battery caging of laying hens – have even 
been explicitly condemned by theologian Joseph 
Ratzinger, later pope Benedict XVI (Ratzinger and 
Seewald, 2002). Industrializing animal production to the 
extent that animals are treated as mere instruments is a 
degradation of the animals’ nature and place in Creation 
and hence an abuse of the stewardship granted to 
humans. Such instrumentalization may correspond to the 
dairy cow case when production means that cows are 
regularly culled after only one or two lactations, possibly 
because they are no longer considered sufficiently 
productive to be maintained in the herd. As for male dairy 
calves, their birth is a natural and unavoidable 
consequence of dairy production, and thus slaughter of 
bobby calves for food is ethically preferable to rearing 
them under conditions which are detrimental to their 
welfare. Veal production, however, if conducted in such a 
way that animals are provided a good life, is not in itself 
immoral. As regards laying hens, industrialized practices 
for sorting and destroying male chicks may be seen as a 
degradation of animals to mere disposable commodities. 
Early identification of male embryos or, alternatively, 
rearing of males for food despite their low productivity, 
seem to be more in line with modern Christian standing 
on the ethical treatment of animals and respect for the 
animals’ nature and purpose. Following the same 
rationale, the Christian view on the use of animals in 
biomedical research is that it is justified as long as it is 
conducted humanely and directed towards the benefit of 
human health (Pacholczyk, 2006). In that sense, animal 
welfare takes precedence over longevity or whatever 
number of animals is used, and thus our actions should 
favour refinement, when in conflict with reduction.  
  
 
Environmental ethics suggest that we should take into 
consideration more global issues of nature and not only 
the particular aspects of life and welfare of individuals. 
Such considerations rarely give a direct answer to the 
question of quantity versus quality, but may have indirect 
implications. It could be argued that the present approach 
of genetic selection of cattle with strong focus on milk 
yield fails in respecting the nature of the cow: cows are 
very different from their ancestors (taller and thinner, with 
larger udders) and less fit to live natural lives. The loss of 
gene pool diversity also means that the species may have 
lost valuable traits needed to adapt to changes in the 
environment. Dual-purpose breeds and breeds with 
greater genetic diversity would be preferable from this 
perspective as regards both cattle and poultry. However, 
some environmental ethicists consider domesticated 
species so dependent upon humans and detached from 
nature that they are more of an artefact than rightful 
members of the natural world (Palmer and Sandøe, 
2011). From this perspective, measures to improve 
production efficiency may actually be an advantage if this 
lessens the negative environmental impact on production. 
Within an environmental perspective, issues such as 
sustainability and resource management also need to be 
taken into account. Animal production has a substantial 
impact in global water footprint (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 
2010) and carbon footprint (Flysjö et al., 2012; FAO, 
2010), and some have suggested that increasing the 
longevity in dairy cows could lessen the environmental 
footprint by reducing “the replacement rate and the 
number of non-productive animals” (Boichard and 
Brochard, 2012, p 548). However, an overall evaluation 
must also include the environmental consequences of 
shifting meat production from dairy to beef herds. It is 
unclear whether such an assessment is possible with 
existing methods for assessing environmental impact of 
livestock products (see de Vries and de Boer, 2010 for a 
review of life cycle assessments of livestock products). 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper we have discussed four real-life cases in 
which there is some sort of conflict between the quality 
and the duration of life. We have used different 
philosophical theories to shed light on the issues at stake, 
providing different answers to what the best solution may 
be to the different dilemmas. Similarly, studies of public 
perception show a diversity of views both among the 
general public and among specialists. Whereas there 
may be some “wrong” answers, it is less likely that there 
will be a single “right” answer to any of the dilemmas. In 
fact, this is exactly what characterizes a moral dilemma: 
there is no answer to it which does not carry its own 
ethical cost.  
 
Traditionally, research and practical efforts in animal 
welfare have been focused on avoiding suffering, and the 
importance of positive experiences have really only been 
highlighted during the last decade (e.g. Boissy et al., 
2007; Yeates and Main, 2008). This is probably reflected 
in some bias towards anti-suffering considerations in the 
analysis presented in this paper, with relevant 
consequences for how the quantity-quality dilemma is 
approached. In its most extreme form, focusing on 
avoiding suffering may make it “morally right to kill off 
everybody to prevent them from suffering” (Sandøe and 
Christiansen, 2007, p548). In contrast, much of the moral 
concern over calves and chicks being killed shortly after 
birth / hatching is probably derived from the notion that 
these animals were never given the opportunity to live 
and to experience the good things of life.  
 
There is also some bias towards the (more concrete) 
question of how to handle existing animals, as opposed to 
the (more abstract) question of which animals should 
come into existence. In many cases, the concrete 
question could have been avoided if the abstract question 
had actually been addressed. This is true for two of our 
four cases: with existing technology (sexed semen) dairy 
farmers can be sure that mostly heifers are born and 
technology may also (at least in the future) prevent the 
conception of male layer-type chicks. Of course, whether 
this distinction is at all relevant depends on whether there 
is a fundamental difference between terminating a life 
early and not allowing a life to start (c.f. Bateson, 2013 for 
a related debate). Society certainly seems to distinguish 
between terminating a life and not allowing it to start if the 
life is human: people are generally free to choose 
whether to have children but are not allowed to kill each 
other. There are also important differences in terms of 
resources needed to generate a full-term young and, at 
least in the case of mammals, in the pain and distress 
  
 
associated with birth and separation of mother and 
young.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
There are real-life cases in which there is some conflict 
between the quality and the duration of life.  
 
In dairy cows, the increase in milk production has been 
accompanied by an increase in production-related 
diseases; both longevity and quality of life are decreasing.  
Male dairy calves are of little value for rearing as beef; 
these calves are typically killed during the first week of 
life, experiencing very little life at all, or are reared for veal 
production under conditions of low quality of life.  
 
Dairy cow longevity and male dairy calves raise 
interconnected questions. Improved cow longevity would 
potentially make it economically viable for farmers to 
combine insemination with sexed dairy semen to 
generate replacement heifers, with meat breed 
insemination for the remaining reproduction, thus 
ensuring that only those calves that would become 
replacement heifers were of a full dairy type, whereas 
those that would go into meat production would be 
crossbred. 
 
Male layer chicks have no commercial value. They are 
killed as soon as the sex can be determined, presently as 
day-old. Several alternative approaches have been 
discussed but the only economically realistic alternative 
under consideration seems to be killing at an even earlier 
time, i.e. before hatching. 
 
In research using animals, there is sometimes a dilemma 
between striving to reduce total numbers of animals and 
to reduce the impact on individual animals, highlighted by 
the potential to re-use animals in different procedures. 
Among scientists, there is no consensus of which of these 
principles should be given priority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION 
 
1. Imagine that you are responsible for running a zoo. A 
choice must be made between letting the lions have cubs 
every summer (and later euthanizing the surplus) or using 
reproductive control so that the lions only have offspring 
when needed to renew the population. Which policy 
would you prefer and why? 
 
2. Is there something like a minimum appropriate duration 
of life – how long a life needs to be to be meaningful?  
 
3. Cow longevity seems to be affected both by selective 
breeding (genotype) and by management practice. What 
can farmers do to influence the longevity of their cows? 
Are there other relevant actors?  
 
4.  Laboratory rodents are usually euthanized at the end 
of experiments, whereas more efforts are made to keep 
larger animals for longer periods of time. What are the 
advantages and disadvantages for the animals? What 
reasons are there to make a difference between species? 
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